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AMERICA'S UNWRITIEN CONSTITUTION: SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND 
POLITICAL ~PONSIBILITY. By Don K. Price. Baton Rouge: Louisi-
ana State University Press. 1983. Pp. xvi, 202. $19.95. 
Don K. Price1 has arrived at a time of life when he could be for-
given for indulging an impluse to recapitulate or even simply to reprint 
previously published views, perhaps prefacing such a work with a brief 
essay highlighting the continuing relevance of any relatively dated the-
ories and placing the various pieces in proper historical context. In 
1. Emeritus professor of government and of public management, Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, Harvard University. 
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this volume,2 Price has done both more and less than this. On the one 
hand, he has reappraised virtually all of the major issues encountered 
in a long career of service to government, private foundations, and 
universities, and has forged them into a thoughtful analysis of Ameri-
can political policymaking. On the other hand, he has done all this in 
a single concise and readable volume that bespeaks a greater concern 
with reaching and influencing a contemporary audience than with pre-
serving the form of past publications. 
The conciseness of his work is suitable in that Price's main concern 
is the "roots of the incoherence of policy which lead[s] many critics to 
wish to amend the U.S. Constitution" (p. 9).3 The "incoherence of 
policy" itself Price generally takes to be self-evident; the nature of the 
perceived problem must be inferred from the proposed solutions.4 The 
focus of the book is rather the underlying intellectual and social struc-
tures which determine whether our governmental institutions are ca-
pable of formulating coherent, unified policies. Price asks: "[H]ow 
can we know what we should do and how we should do it and how we 
may hold government responsible? That is to say, what is the authori-
tative source of truth on which we should rely" (p. 4)? These questions 
raise broad and inherently amorphous issues, which it would be only 
too easy to talk around at great length without achieving useful insight 
or reform. Accordingly, Price dispenses with an extensive analytic 
and bibliographic apparatus, saying, "The issues here are too broad to 
be dealt with by the precise methods of the scientific study of politics 
and society, but the stakes are high enough to discourage professional 
timidity" (p. 14). To strike at the roots of incoherence, in other words, 
one must at times run the risk of appearing opinionated and 
conclusory. 
In Price's case, any such appearance would be somewhat decep-
tive, for the groundwork for these opinions and conclusions has in fact 
been laid by his previously published works, spanning more than four 
decades. The thesis, for example, that America's "unwritten constitu-
tion" - "the fixed political customs that have developed without for-
mal Constitutional amendment, but that have been authorized by 
statute or frozen, at least temporarily, in tradition" (p. 9) - ought to 
be the focus of reform, derives significant support from Price's early 
work. In the late 1930's, Price coauthored a series of studies on the 
efficacy of the "city manager" form of government in selected cities. 
2. This book has also been reviewed by Genuth, Book Review, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS, Mar. 1984, at 43. 
3. An extreme manifestation of this tendency is the ongoing effort to call a constitutional 
convention in order to pass a balanced budget amendment. See The Constitution as Cudgel, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 6, 1982, at 22, col. 1. 
4. Price's proposals presume that a coherent policy is not simply one that leads to cost-
effective or nonduplicative programs. It also sets forth clear and specific goals with which voters 
can agree or disagree so that the act of voting is as meaningful as possible. 
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The city manager was seen at the time "as America's most promising 
illustration of the need to separate management cleanly from policy 
interests in the interest of economy and efficiency" (p. 172). Yet, de-
tailed empirical study at times turned up cases such as that of Jackson, 
Michigan: "The theory of the city manager plan has never been gener-
ally understood in Jackson. . . . Old political habits continued un-
changed from one form of government to the other, making it 
impossible under either for the electorate to exercise much control 
over the policies of the administration."5 
Price was already well-educated to perceive the importance of "old 
political habits" by study (begun as a Rhodes Scholar in the early 
1930's) of the United Kingdom's unwritten parliamentary constitu-
tion. 6 The central lesson derived from these early studies is that new 
written rules alone will never change "old political habits," and that 
the key to political reform is "to command a consensus between the 
major political parties . . . [that] would amount to an agreement on 
how the unwritten constitution of the United States should operate" 
(p. 128). 
These and other earlier studies are incorporated by reference in the 
instant work, primarily by the device of prefacing each chapter's foot-
notes with "reminiscences of the personal experiences which were re-
sponsible . . . for the opinions and prejudices that show through any 
scholarly work" (p. 153). The result is two books bound in one cover 
- the first a scholarly discourse, the second, in essence, Price's (abbre-
viated) memoirs. The use of this device reveals not only the sort of 
authority ultimately relied upon in this book, but, in a sense, the sort 
of authority Price suggests ought ultimately to be relied upon by gov-
ernment itself. Thus, a central conclusion of the book is that decisions 
on "[t]he more important issues that arise at the higher levels of the 
governmental hierarchy . . . ought to be controlled in the end not by 
scientific data or predetermined rules but by moral and political judg-
ment, guided in tum by a concern for the general welfare" (p. 143). 
Readers may perhaps be satisfied by less rigorous documentation 
when their author's "moral and political judgment" seems sound. It is 
less clear that citizens in a democracy should be encouraged to defer in 
a comparable way to government officials by entrusting a select cadre 
of them with the "substance of policy" (p. 80). By analogy to the 
British civil service, however, Price proposes just such an institution:' 
"a career service heading the major departments of a government, 
with lifetime commitments and a common outlook or education and at 
S. H. STONE, D. PRICE & K. STONE, CrrY MANAGER GOVERNMENT IN JACKSON (MICHi· 
GAN) 48 (Pub. Admin. Serv. No. SP.13, 1939). 
6. See Price, The Parliamentary System, 3 PUB. Ao. REv. 317 (1943). 
7. An especially formative experience with regard to this proposal was Price's service on 
former President Hoover's Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch. 
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least partly beyond political control" (p. 76). By "common educa-
tion," he means that these civil servants would be "generalists" as op-
posed to legal and scientific experts. 8 Price's suggestions for creating 
this establishment within government include decreasing the number 
and type of congressional checks on agencies and programs, creating 
cabinet committees with genuine authority to formulate policy away 
from the media spotlight, decreasing the numbers of political appoin-
tees, and reducing staff size in Congress and.the Executive Office of the 
President. 
In Price's view, giving the executive more freedom to act is the best 
way to make government more accountable to the people. His new 
version of the unwritten constitution would call for a disciplined Con-
gress, in which party leaders are able to deliver or withhold support 
and maintain a firm party line, to delegate to the president enough 
authority to carry out and coordinate the laws. A streamlined execu-
tive office, in turn, sets the overall goals of policy and delegates author-
ity, through the cabinet, to a cadre of depoliticized professionals who 
independently work out and execute the government's programs. Ac-
countability is assured both by the more direct causal link between 
voters and government action and by the more coherent manner in 
which the business of government is carried out: "In ideal terms, this 
is the more democratic and responsible arrangement since it focuses 
the attention of the electorate and Congress as a whole on the main 
general issues, which they are interested in and competent to decide, 
rather than on technical or procedural details, which they are not" (p. 
141). 
Thus, Price's direct answers to the difficult question he poses are 
quite striking. The "authoritative source of truth on which we should 
rely" in setting national policy is not religion (the written Constitution 
prevents this), not science (which the unwritten constitution has rele-
gated to a role similar to that of religion), and not law (which is not a 
source of truth at all, but at best a codification of truths arrived at by 
other means). It may be objected that the "moral and political judg-
ment" Price posits instead as the ultimate policymaking guide is not 
an "authoritative source of truth" either, but rather a name for the 
kind of comprehensive and disinterested review of goals and antici-
pated effects that ideally takes place before any government program is 
implemented. Nonetheless, Price argues that it is a failure to defer to 
expertise in this mode of analysis which has fostered, in recent years, a 
"partly scientistic and partly legalistic" (p. 93) approach to lawmaking 
that precludes coherent and responsible government. 
8. Nonetheless, it would probably not be unreasonable to envision this elite corps as people 
very much like Price's students at the Kennedy School of Government. In terms of existing 
governmental structures, the recently instituted Senior Executive Service is positioned to become 
such a corps, but would have to be expanded and modified significantly to meet Price's criteria. 
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Attempts to legislate scientific goals directly, without tempering 
the scientists' "abstract and specialized view of the truth" (p. 58) with 
a measured sense of priorities, results in programs that are liable to be 
partially or wholly counterproductive.9 At the same time, the legalis-
tic tendency to curb abuse of power through extensive congressional 
oversight of agencies and programs splinters democratic responsibility 
in the legislature and removes accountability from the president and 
the departments. 
The American voters' manifest preference for the genial generalist 
Ronald Reagan over both the scrupulous scientist Jimmy Carter and 
Washington lawyer Walter Mondale illustrates the timeliness, if not 
necessarily the accuracy, of Price's critique. The voters' acceptance of 
a president who seems to rely upon his own moral and political judg-
ment in preference to detailed technical knowledge in his decisionmak-
ing does not, however, indicate a willingness to permit an unelected 
bureaucracy similarly to set its own policy. On the contrary, at pre-
sent there appears to be a durable consensus against the creation of a 
new and powerful entrenched establishment within the federal govern-
ment. Price confronts this objection directly, acknowledging the exis-
tence of a deep-seated American "prejudice against establishments" 
and loathing for bureaucracy (p. 77). He goes even further, and sets 
up an analogy between our theological past, with its antiestablishment 
bias, and our scientific present, typified by a deep attachment to aca-
demic freedom. In this scheme, absolute, unyielding truths may moti-
vate political action so long as religious and scientific institutions are 
not part of the government, nor so closely allied with government as to 
dictate results inconsistent with democracy and justice. Having ratified 
this American prejudice insofar as it extends to established religion 
and science, Io Price maintains that we should not carry our prejudice 
against establishments to the extreme of banishing policy-making ex-
pertise from government. Rather, we should see to it that there is an 
institution firmly implanted in the government which can preserve co-
herence, fairness, and continuity in the execution of the laws. 
Once a viable solution is paired in the public's mind with a press-
ing need, a consensus that changes the unwritten constitution may 
well arise with surprising speed. While it may be easier to command a 
consensus upon some of Price's proposals than others, they are all 
worthy of consideration, and their presentation serves to make them 
appear neither more nor less significant than they actually are. 
9. The original and detailed form of this argument may be found in D. PRICE, GOVERN-
MENT AND SCIENCE: THEIR DYNAMIC RELATION IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1954); D. 
PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC Es°fATE (1965). 
10. An example of established science is the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which, Price ob-
serves, "in its complete dependence on government authority and support and its dedication to a 
quasi-scientific ideology that justifies absolute authority, is rather like the old Russian Orthodox 
church in its relation to the czars." Pp. 11-12. 
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As a final point, it is perhaps also significant that Price's thought is 
characterized by a pervasive, unpolarized dualism: Though fond of 
thinking in two's, Price never thinks in opposites. As a youth, he was 
driven to inquire into the necessity of having two Methodist Episcopal 
churches in one small Virginia town, and was gratified to be told, 
"Why, of course, we have to have one church for the Republican 
Methodists and one for the Democrat Methodists" (p. 154). In a field 
whose broadest conceivable distinction seems to be that often elusive 
contrast between Republican and Democrat, this fascination with con-
templating the profound differences between two things that are very 
much alike - mayors and city managers, British and American gov-
ernment, personal prejudice and scholarly predilection - is surely a 
valuable trait. Imagine his intellectual thrill when his Oxford tutor 
told him: "You American students never seem to understand. . . . 
Merton College has no rule against climbing into the college after mid-
night. It has a very strict rule against getting caught climbing into the 
college after midnight" (p. 159). 
